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While it is increasingly becoming a platitude that exceptionalism exists in
international law, little is being said about the nature, degrees of this exceptionalism
and their differential consequences on the international legal system.
In my effort to bridge what I see as an oversight, this paper will seek to
show how contemporary exceptionalist practices are creating a fault in the
international legal order which will in turn provide a basis for others to argue for an
overall reformulation of rules i.e. actions in contravention of the multilateral
international legal framework would no longer need to be justified by manipulative
rule interpretation but by a clear challenge to the very morals and standards on
which they are built. The friction between these unilateral ambitions and the
widespread opposition to incidents along the lines witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq
(which perhaps indicative of a larger disaffection with the option of being
exceptional as a matter of right) will not only undermine the interests of the
international community but will also prove to be against the interests of even the
most exceptional hegemon (which will ultimately find it impossible to sustain its
position of global influence in the face of rapidly fading trust and legitimacy).
Thus, conforming to the Charter paradigm and keeping state
exceptionalism tied within multilateral restrictions is not only in the larger interest of
global peace and security but also in the specific interest of any state seeking to
retain its position and mandate as a global peacekeeper. In the course of this paper,
I will seek to explore the possibilities that various kinds of exceptionalism opens up
for the future of the international order and argue that the ends will satisfy neither
the goals of any state(/s) nor the international community as a whole.

(I)

THE PROBLEM WITH GLORY
Oh the history books tell it, they tell it so well
The cavalries charged, the Indians fell
The cavalries charged, the Indians died
Oh the country was young, with God on its side.1

The history of the world has seen four realistic attempts when “men have sat down to
reorder the world”; the most recent of these was after World War II in San Francisco
(1945) leading to the formation of the United Nations.2 This was to be an organization
aimed to further peace, whose tools would be diplomacy backed by collective security3
and whose very basis of existence would be an unfettered belief in the equality of
nations.4
1

BOB DYLAN, WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE, verse 2, © 1963 M. Witmark & Sons, renewed 1991
Special Rider Music.

2

Historian JOHN KEEGAN has cited the other 3 occasions as: “at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris
in 1919 after World War I”, as cited in STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, More Than Ever, We Need the
UN, Los Angeles Times (Wednesday, September 24, 2003) (available at:
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0924-06.htm).
3

U.N. Charter, Chapter V, 59 Stat. 1031 T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, amended 24 U.S.T. 2225
T.I.A.S. 7739 [hereinafter Charter]. Much has been said lauding the collective security
mechanism --- See DAVID D. CARON, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, 87 AM. J. INTL. L. 552, 573-574 (1993); MICHAEL HOWARD, The Historical
Development of the UN’s Role in International Security in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD
63, 77-78 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds. 2nd ed. 1993) (discussing the effectiveness
of the UN Peacekeeping Forces). However, enough of the literature raises doubts on the ability of
international law to assure global security, see John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global
Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 205, 208-209 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith, The SelfDefeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (2003);
4

Id. Charter, art. 2, para 1. The principle has been endorsed at a number of fora, for instance, at
the 1945 San Francisco Conference it was pointed out that States are “juridically equal”, see
UNCIO VI, 457, Doc. 944, 1/1/34 (1). Similarly, the 1970 Friendly Declaration spelt out that
States “…have equal rights and duties”, see U.N.GAOR 2625 (XXV) of 24th Oct. 1970. Thus
while undisputed and realistic equality may not ever have been a reality, the principle of
sovereign equality is a concession between peers, which has continuously inspired solutions to
international relations problems. It is simply a principle of organization of the international
community, which does not imply equality between subjects of international law. “It is an
equality before the rule, not within the rule”, see Michael Cosnard, Sovereign Equality –“The
Wimbledon Sails On” in US HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 117
(Michael Byers et al. eds. 2003). See also Mariana Florentino Cuellar, Reflections On Sovereignty
and Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 211 (2004) (“It [UN Charter] also incorporated a
cluster of interrelated legal doctrines emphasizing the sovereign equality and territorial integrity
of nations and prohibiting aggressive war among them”) [hereinafter Cuellar]
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However, keeping in mind the lessons learnt from the failure of the League of
Nations, the fifty-one Charter nations at San Francisco, sought a reasonable balance
between value-based idealism and power-based realism by acknowledging the
importance of major world powers lending their support to this effort. Thus the
motivation behind the initial acknowledgement of the ‘powerful’ nation status was to
ensure the support and productive involvement of some of the world’s major decision
making states. It was in good faith believed that the greatest decision-making authority
must lie with states having the primary responsibility for preventing a world war. This
same authority was realized by the creation of the Security Council with its exclusive
membership, widespread authority and discretionary veto,5 all of which were then placed
into the hands of the aforementioned powerful states.
This however is seen differently by different nations, for instance, the United
States has interpreted this acknowledgement as being commemorative of the inevitable
conclusion that “some countries would be more equal than others”.6 The attitude
conveyed, is summarized by Edward Luck’s assertion that, “United States policymakers
seem to care a lot less about whether their chosen courses of action are labeled as
unilateralist or multilateralist than do their critics in other capitals.”7 This is the
exceptionalism, which threatens the future of multilateral decision-making in the future.
The idea of “American exceptionalism,” is generally credited to Alexis de
Tocqueville8 and his belief that “the United States was created differently, developed
differently, and thus has to be understood differently—essentially on its own terms and
within its own context.”9
5

The veto was developed as the “essential glue that kept the great powers in the bargain”. See
Remarks by the United States Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs – Kim R.
Holmes, THE UN CHARTER: THEN AND NOW, at a Conference on "The Future of the UN and
International Law" sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Bonn, Germany: November
21, 2003) (available at: http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/26960.htm) [hereinafter Holmes]
6

Id.

7

See Edward C. Luck, Exceptionalism, Power and Global Architecture, Centre on Int’l Org.
(SIPA, Columbia) paper prepared for the Conference on Emerging Global Challenges: Managing
Interdependence in a Complex World (May31st, 2002) at 6 [hereinafter Luck]. This disregard for
established customary international law is clearly visible in the text of the United States National
Security Strategy (released on Sept 20th, 2002) which expressly adopted and then attempted to
stretch (“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today’s adversaries”) the Webster formula, making no mention of the UN Charter (as if implying
the pre-1945 customary right of self defense as being the applicable law), see The National
Security Strategy of the United States, at 15 (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf) as cited in
Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change,
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II, No. 2, 171 at 182. [Hereinafter Byers]
8

See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, volume II, (1970) [hereinafter
Tocqueville]

9

See BYRON SHAFER, ed., IS AMERICA DIFFERENT?, v. (1991). See also Robert Weisberg,
Values, Violence and the Second Amendment: American Charter, Constitutionalism, and Crime,
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As much as this may seem reasonable, the idea of exceptionalism has very often
been misconstrued to signify an imperial position conveyed not only by publicists10 but
also by highly ranked officials.11 Such a construction of Tocqueville’s exceptionalism is
inaccurate as the author himself proceeded to emphasize the need for developing a more
objective outlook towards foreign cultures and civilizations by saying, “Let us cease,
then, to view all democratic nations under the example of the American people, and
attempt to survey them at length with their own features”.12
While it is increasingly becoming a platitude that exceptionalism exists in
international law, little is being said about the nature, degrees of this exceptionalism and
their differential consequences on the international legal system. In my effort to bridge
what I see as an oversight, this paper will seek to show how contemporary exceptionalist
39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002). The concept has been employed mostly to explain why throughout
its history the U.S. has not had a significant labor or socialist movements within its territory, see
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1997).
10

See Lea Brilmayer, Transforming International Politics: An American Role For the Post Cold
War World, 64 U CIN L REV 119, 123, 127-128 (1995) (where the author has argued that the
concept of the equality of states is a legal fiction, and that the reality of contemporary world
politics is one of hierarchy in which hegemonic states like the U.S. should "assume the role of
executive officer for the world community at large," or "something akin to an unelected monarch
working in conjunction with an elected legislature" and exercise "a right to lead and, in the
process of leadership, to do things that are forbidden to other nations"). See also Detlev Vagts,
Hegemonic International Law, 95 AJIL 843 (2001) quoting Charles Krauthammer (“[he said] in
Time magazine ‘America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world,
more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a position to reshape norms,
alter expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and impeccable
demonstrations of will.’”)
11

See Dick Cheney (United States Secretary of Defense), DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S:
The Regional Defense Strategy (available at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.Info/pdf/naa
pr_Defense.pdf) [hereinafter Defense draft] which has been described by David Armstrong as:
“The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is
unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United
States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new
rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion
over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more
powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.”
See David Armstrong, Dick Cheney’s Song of America, United States Congressional Record
(October 10th 2002) (available at: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American_Empire/Che
ney's_Song_America.html) (hereinafter Armstrong)
12

Tocqueville, supra note 8 at 36-7. Quite the opposite argument was made by Bloom with
reference to contemporary higher education, when the author argued against the prima facie
acceptance of relativism without the application of individual reason and the recognition
prejudices, see generally ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND, (1987).
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practices are creating a fault in the international legal order which will in turn provide a
basis for others to argue for an overall reformulation of rules i.e. actions in contravention
of the multilateral international legal framework would no longer need to be justified by
manipulative rule interpretation but by a clear challenge to the very morals and standards
on which they are built. The friction between these unilateral ambitions and the
widespread opposition to incidents along the lines witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq (which
perhaps indicative of a larger disaffection with the option of being exceptional as a matter
of right) will not only undermine the interests of the international community but will
also prove to be against the interests of even the most exceptional hegemon (which will
ultimately find it impossible to sustain its position of global influence in the face of
rapidly fading trust and legitimacy). Thus, conforming to the Charter paradigm and
keeping state exceptionalism tied within multilateral restrictions is not only in the larger
interest of global peace and security but also in the specific interest of any state seeking
to retain its position and mandate as a global peacekeeper. In the course of this paper, I
will seek to explore the possibilities that various kinds of exceptionalism opens up for the
future of the international order and argue that the ends will satisfy neither the goals of
any state(/s) nor the international community as a whole.
I begin my inquiry by arguing that exceptionalism displayed by the United States
and NATO (as the most powerful economic and political actors in the international
community) has created precedents for other smaller power centers to follow suit.
Second, I describe how this precedent may prove to be a bigger challenge than the West
can handle because the religion and culture based exceptionalism displayed by many like
the Islamic groups is far more dangerous, acting as it does, with absolute disregard for the
western notions of fundamental human rights and democratic structures such a
transparency and freedom of information (which the western exceptionalists would feel
pressured to at least pay lip service to). In as much as I see these forces threatening the
sanctity of the international world order,13 I would use the third portion of my paper to
oppose the notion that international law has been breached to the significant extent that
such cracks and consequent seepage of exceptionalism needs to become the rule rather
than the exception. Quite to the contrary, I would contend that unilateral actions have
begun to isolate its perpetrators shaking their legitimacy before the international
community.
Finally, I would conclude that the global dissent against the actions of the U.S. in
Kosovo and Iraq are symbolic of the international community’s continued affection for
the Charter paradigm and that the way ahead is not to pursue a rethinking of standards but
a reinforcement of the boundaries that the Charter places upon Westphalian liberties.

13

In finding a suitably broad definition of the phrase ‘international legal order’ I accept
Professor Schachter’s description of it as being a socio-political product of convergent
perspectives of formal authority and actual behaviour, see Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of
International Obligation, 8 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 300-322 (1968).
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(II)

SETTING THE STAGE: Creating precedents that perpetuate breaches

First world diplomacy has always attempted to manipulate the international legal
system to its advantage.14 However, even till a few decades ago, the U.S. attempted to
manipulate and stretch interpretations (in Grenada15 and Panama16) to provide legality to
its actions.17 This in itself showed some concern on the part of the governing parties
towards the authority of the UN and mandates of sovereign equality and collective
security as enshrined in the Charter. The 90’s however, signaled in a new era of foreign
policy where the concept of ‘security’ was expanded from demilitarization and
containment to a more “forward presence”18 so as to ensure the expansion of American
beliefs and interests.19 This transition was accurately articulated by Anthony Lake, (the
14

See Byers, supra note 7 at 173, where the author cites 16th century Spain, 18th century France
and 19th century Britain as precedents of such diplomacy.
15

In Grenada (1983), the United States alleged that some American students were under threat
and relied in part on a claimed right to protect nationals from threatened attack to justify invading
the territory of another nation. The State Department under Reagan and Bush asserted that this
right to protect citizens from potential harm came within Article 51's exception for self-defense.
However, this was one of three parallel justifications provided by the U.S. and the same was
actively condemned by a large majority of states. See W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA
INTERVENTION, 55-64 (1984). See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 792 (4th ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Shaw]
16

In Panama (1989), the United States argued self-defense (parallel to arguments based on the
need to restore democracy and secure the Panama Canal), once again by way of protecting its
nationals (one American had been killed and several others allegedly harassed), see V. Nanda,
The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AJIL
(1990) 494, 497. See also OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir
Arthur Watts eds.), 436 at n. 14 (vol. 1, 9th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Oppenheim]
17

See Mary Ellen O’Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of SelfDefense, 31:1 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101 at 113 (2003) [hereinafter O’Connell: Selfdefense]
18

See Armstrong, supra note 11 (Both Cheney and Powell and his staff believed that a weakened
Soviet Union would result in shifting alliances and regional conflict. The United States was the
only nation capable of managing the forces at play in the world; it would have to remain the
preeminent military power in order to ensure the peace and shape the emerging order in
accordance with American interests. U.S. military strategy, therefore, would have to shift from
global containment to managing less-well-defined regional struggles and unforeseen
contingencies.)

19

Conservative factions in America have maintained that the purpose of the foreign policy is to
use its military force and political power to serve the clear moral purpose of "actively promoting
American principles of governance abroad--democracy, free markets, respect for liberty", if
necessary by force. See William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign
Policy, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 18, 23 (July-Aug 1996); Robert Kagan, The Benevolent Empire, 111
FOREIGN POL. 24 (Summer 1998); Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN
AFF. 23 (1990/1991).
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then National Security Adviser to Clinton’s first administration), when in describing the
foreign policy goals of the new administration (in 1993) he argued that “the successor to
a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement--enlargement of the world's
free community of market democracies".20 Unfortunately this “new interventionism”21 (by
way of enlargement) in collusion with the already prevalent exceptionalist attitude,
initiated the undermining of the Charter paradigm enshrining state sovereignty and
prohibiting the use of force except in self-defense.
The aforementioned undermining of the UN system was assured when in June of
1998 the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen argued that NATO would not need a
UN Security Council authorization to intervene in Kosovo.22 This stand was later diluted
by the then Secretary of State---Madeline Albright, when at a NATO meeting in Dec.
1998, she said:
“Let me say a word about (Security Council) mandates. NATO will in all
cases act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, while
continuing to address the issue on a case-by-case basis.”23

However, an unilateralist precedent was confirmed when the attitude of
superiority and exceptionalism allowed the US to stand above international law and the
mandates of multilateralism as the Clinton administration followed through in its second
term, with NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999; an abject use of force for which the
U.S. government saw no reason to provide legal justifications to the international
community.24
20

Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'From
Containment to Enlargement' delivered at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., Sept 21, 1993, cited in Jules Lobel,
AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19 (Spring, 2000) [hereinafter Lobel]
21

See Stephen John Stedman, The New Interventionists, 72 FOREIGN AFF 1, 4 (America and the
World 1992-1993).
22

See Remarks of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen at Los Angeles Foreign Affairs
Council Breakfast, Federal News Service, June 29, 1998 at 10 available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO and International Law After Kosovo, 22
HUM. RTS. Q. 57 at 76 (2000)[hereinafter O’Connell: Kosovo]
23

Id. at 79

24

Id. at 115, note 69 (“The US did put on a defense at the ICJ in a case brought by Yugoslavia.
Basically it followed the British lead and argued that the Yugoslav bombing came close to being
justified. In the weeks before the case however, repeated calls to the Legal Adviser’s office at the
US Dept. of state yielded promises of return calls that never came, referrals to phone nos. for
disconnected phones and recommendations to call the office of public affairs, which had no idea
what the request meant.”). See also Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 1
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-21 (2000).
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Assuming the more recent statement by the US Secretary of State to be the
practice expected from the state, the actions of the US and NATO in Kosovo were clearly
violative of the Article 53(1) of the Charter which states
“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception
of measures against any enemy state [i.e. any state which during WWII was
the enemy of any signatory of the present Charter]…”25

This is in somewhat of a direct contradiction to the initial basis for which an
exclusive position of responsibility was given to the United States within the framework
of the United Nations. As stated initially, the purpose of collective security within the
mandates of the Security Council was that while the Charter believed in and sought to
encourage the equality of all nations, they respected the practicality that without nations
like the United States taking the initiative in war prevention, the UN may never gain
respectability much like its predecessor. Thus while the United States (through the
Security Council) is put in a position of authority to legislate for the international
community as a collective, its actions as an agent for this global community must be
bound by a basic standard of morality and accountable against the same.
Immanuel Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” is a principle that exemplifies one
such moral standard when it reasons that an agent ought to “act only according to that
maxim by which . . . [one] can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law.”26 Under the rationale of this principle, an agent (however powerful) like the United
States must act upon a policy only if he is willing to allow everyone else concerned, to do
the same.27 The rationale behind this principle fits perfectly with the equality of states
ideal since it conveys that a standard once accepted, be made applicable to all.
An exceptionalist outlook then, would be virtually antithetic to such a standard of
morality since a state suffering from this condition may be generally diagnosed with,

25

See Charter, art. 53(1)

26

See IMMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, (tr. Lewis White
Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 421 as cited in JUDITH LICHTENBERG, Pre-emption
and Exceptionalism in U.S. Foreign Policy: Precedent and Example in the International Arena in
WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
(Thomas G. Weiss, Margaret E. Crahan, and John Goering, eds.,) (London: 2004)[hereinafter
Lichtenberg]
27

While Kant’s categorical imperative was intended to be much stricter and austerely objective, a
simpler and more subjective interpretation would imply that agents must assess the legitimacy of
their reasons (and thereby their actions) by their willingness to accept the universalization of such
rationale. Id.
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“(1) A willingness to define its own path and positions within and toward international
institutions, regardless of pressures and critiques by others;28
(2) A proclivity for asserting the universal validity of its national values and
practices;29
(3) A tendency to look to domestic sources for legitimacy, even in the face of
contradictory rulings by international bodies;30
(4) A confidence that national policymakers have alternative ways of pursuing national
interests and values, so that the use of multilateral institutions is generally perceived to be an
31
option, not an obligation. ”32
28

This is best seen in the myriad of ways and justifications using which the United States actually
exempts itself from certain international law rules and agreements, even ones that it may have
played a critical role in framing, through such techniques as noncompliance; non ratification;
ratification with reservations, understandings, and declarations; the non-self-executing treaty
doctrine, see Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. (2003) 1479 at
1482, 1483 [hereinafter Koh]. The latest act in furtherance of this trend being, the unsigning of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), see Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning,
55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003).
29

The American obsession with its First Amendment to the extent of its blatant disregard for
economic, social and cultural human rights is made obvious by its conspicuous absence from a
number of international human rights covenants, for instance, its refusal to ratify the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (U.N. G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49 entered into force January 3, 1976) because it does not recognize
economic rights to housing, employment and so on. In keeping with this ideology, the U.S. has
also refused to be party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly on Nov. 20, 1989) and the CEDAW (Adopted and opened for signature,
ratification under U.N. GAOR 34/180 on Dec.18, 1979) which are instruments dedicated to
raising the status of women and children especially with relation to unfair labour practices
adopted in many third world nations. On the contrary, its singular stress with respect to human
rights has been along the lines of civil and political freedoms as advanced under the premise of its
own Constitution. See R. Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Developments and International
Human Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, at 4, 17
(2001)[hereinafter Klein].
30

This has even been espoused by some American Supreme Court Justices, and typified by
Justice Scalia's statement in Stanford v. Kentucky that the practices of foreign countries are
irrelevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation, because, in construing open-ended provisions of
the Bill of Rights, "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive", 492 U.S. 361, 369
n.1 (1989) (emphasis in original) as cited in Koh, supra note 28 at 1482. Quite the opposite
however, is argued by Justice Ginsburg when she advocates the use of a “comparative dialogue”
(citing similar assertions by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), see Ruth Bader
GINSBURG, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1,2 (2003). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472, 2481 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-343 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
31

A common element of the Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo bombings was the US and
NATO’s disregard for both international law and the United Nations. This is made obvious to the
extent that the US Secretary of State stated that multilateralism and presumably international law,
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It is recognized that using the above premise for identifying exceptionalism would
lead to the characterization of the Soviet Union, China, and France as exceptionalist in
their conduct at various periods in the UN’s history.33 However it needs to emphasized
that none of these nations had ever possessed as much power or pomp as the present day
United States; nor have they consistently used this exceptionalism as the unabashed basis
of their foreign policy (that too within the folds of a multilateralist world order). Only the
US has been able to achieve this ignoble distinction not only within but also outside the
UN system.
Along these lines, the U.S. in the course of flaunting its exceptionalist traits fails
the Kantian standard on two distinct grounds:
First, the entire point of the American exceptionalist attitude is to convey that its
actions and reasons are above all others and cannot be judged by the generalized
standards of international law (since it is “exceptional”). This manifesto lies at the heart
of exceptionalism as perceived by U.S. foreign policy. The most prominent instance of
which is found in the Dick Cheney’s controversial “Defense Planning Guidance Draft”
of 199234 wherein the United States is presented as the overarching leader of the world,
benevolently35 forming regional alliances, enforced and maintained with permanent
are means and not ends, and thus may be done without in the interest of national interests, see, for
example, Madeline Albright, The United and the United Nations: Confrontation or Consensus?,
LXI Vital Speeches of the Day 354 (Apr 1, 1995) as cited in Lobel, supra note 20 at 36, n. 30.
This national interest argument was used prominently once again in February of 1998 when the
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement regarding weapons inspections with
Iraq; Madeline Albright once again presented US’s exceptionalist (and thereby unilateralist)
stance when she said "[if] we don't like [Annan's agreement] we will pursue our national
interests", thereby reserving the use of force as a viable option, see Dan Morgan, Administration
Weighs Steps in Case U.N.-Iraq Deal Doesn't Satisfy U.S., Wash Post, (Feb 23,1998), A15. See
also Luck, supra note 7 at 12 where the author has argued that while the majority support has
backed the American Executive in its undertaking of international and multilateral obligations, a
vocal and politically active minority of about 15% has opposed –“generation after generation” the expansion of international institutions and of US participation in them, largely because of
perceived threats to national sovereignty. The proponents of this minority are no doubt absolute
mascots of American exceptionalism in an era of eroding sovereignty.
32

See AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: Lessons from the
1990s, in The US and Multilateral Organizations, (Rosemary Foot, Neil MacFarlane, and
Michael Mastanduno, eds.) (2002) as cited in Luck, supra no 7 at 8.
33

See generally G.V. PLEKHANOV, Socialism and The Political Struggle (available at http://ww
w.marxists. org/archive/plekhanov/1883/struggle/chap1.htm).
34

Defense Draft supra note 11

35

I say ‘benevolently’ to point out a declaration within the draft that exemplifies the US’s
outspoken propensity for unilateralism -- “The perceived ability –which depends upon the actual
ability – of the United States to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even
in those cases where we do not actually use it. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume
a leadership role. In some cases we [i.e. the US] will promote the assumption of leadership by
others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations.” See Defense Draft, supra note 11

-9-

strategic installations and military presence.36 Thus the question of America’s allowing
this reasoning (‘maxim’) to be universally applicable does not arise.
Second, implicit in the ‘categorical imperative’ is the syllogism that the rationale
behind the agent’s actions (the 'maxim’) should be accessible to all other parties
concerned before the same can become universally accepted or contested (since all
actions must be viewed from the standpoint of multilateral consensus which is the basis
of the UN). Along these lines, what needs to be unequivocally clarified is that along with
the tremendous authority and responsibility (that is placed on the U.S. through its
position in the Security Council) must be attached, the greatest standard of accountability
to the international community. In this regard, the outspoken denial of an obligation to
justify its actions is a most unfortunate trend initiated by the U.S. which has set not only a
most dangerous precedent but also established a damning line of thought.
At this point, academic fairness demands that I reiterate that the danger from
exceptionalist statehood is not limited to the particular instance of the United States.37 As
stated earlier, the corrupter is the power of the State in “collusion” with a cultural attitude
of inherent (or even divinely ordained) superiority.38 Rainier Baum’s “invariance
hypothesis” alludes to how the former is capable of causing a heightened awareness of
the latter, from a societal as well as an individual point of view. On a societal level, an
enhancement in the economic, military and political power of the society encourages
people to have confidence in their roots and consequently become culturally aggressive;
while on the individual level, the increased standard of economic and political
empowerment causes people to become more individualistic thereby weakening
traditional bonds, heightening feelings of alienation and causing the proverbial ‘identity
crisis’. This leads the individual to seek shelter in religion and traditional value systems
thereby heralding cultural resurgence.39
at 8 (“CONTINUED U.S. LEADERSHIP”). This benevolence has been echoed elsewhere as a “benign
hegemon”, see Luck, supra note 7 at 6.
36

See Defense Draft, supra note 11 at 8 (“ENDURING REQUIREMENTS” )

37

See supra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text.

38

In the ‘The Origins of Satan’, Elaine Pagels traces the evolution of Satan from his roots in the
Hebrew Bible. She explains that the evolving image of Satan served “to confirm for Christians
their own identification with God and to demonize their opponents---first other Jews, then pagans
and later dissident Christians called Heretics…The use of Satan to represent one’s enemies lends
to conflict a special kind or moral and religious…in which ‘we’ are God’s people and ‘they’ are
God’s enemies, and ours as well…Such a moral interpretation of conflict has proven
extraordinarily effective throughout Western history in consolidating the identity of Christian
groups”, see ROBERT JAY CLIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE, xvii (1968).
39

See Rainier Baum, Authority and Identity --- The Invariance Hypothesis II, Zeitschrift für
Soziologie, 6 (Oct. 1977), 368-369 as cited in SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Huntington:
Clash]. While the “Invariance hypothesis” traces the society’s enhanced economic, military and
political power to an infusion of Westernization and/or modernization, such a consideration is
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Every society, culture or civilization has an underlying belief in its superiority to
others around it and it is this societal pride and belief in its uniqueness that Alexis de
Tocqueville referred to as exceptionalism, one that can arise within any similarly placed
society; the danger arises in its “collusion” with material power. In this case, it should
suffice to say that
“The fundamental problem is that America today has too much power for
anyone’s good, including its own…the problem with American power is not
that it is American. The problem is simply the power. It would be dangerous
even for an archangel to wield so much power.”40

However in recent times, the predominant danger of unilateralism has indeed
arisen from the United States and its allies, specifically the NATO. A danger which has
once again been initiated by the overstepping of the Charter’s mandates in pursuit of an
exceptionalist approach to international relations and the idea of security through regional
arrangements.
Article 52 of the Charter espouses the creation of such “regional arrangements”
when it states
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action
provided that such arrangements…and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”41

Having assured such a vast scope of action to regional arrangements, the Charter
in its foresight includes provisions such as Article 52(4) wherein it clearly stresses that
the application of Articles 34 and 35 elating to the roles of the Security Council
[hereinafter Council] and the General Assembly [hereinafter Assembly] remain
unaffected.42 The supremacy of the Council is reinforced by Article 53(1), which
provides that while the Council may, “where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement
action shall be taken…without the authorization of the Security Council”. Moreover,
while Article 24 of the Charter is explicit in placing upon the Council the “primary
largely inconsequential for the purposes of the argument made in this paper since the major
premise on which the “collusion” argument bases itself is the idea that once a society has this
power (and an underlying culture and value system), the combination is most likely to create a
lineage of exceptionalist tendencies.
40

See Timothy Garton Ash, The Peril of Too Much Power, N. Y. Times, (April 11, 2002) A4 at 6.

41

See Charter, supra note 3 at art. 52(1). See also B. SIMMA ed., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, (Oxford: 1995) 679.
42

See Shaw, supra note 15 at 729.
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responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”; Article 103
emphasizes that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of a UN member under
the Charter and obligations under any other international agreement, the former will
prevail.43
Thus, in law there is enough and more room to doubt any justifications that
NATO may provide for bombing Kosovo without the prior authorization of the Council.44
Despite this, the Russian and Chinese draft resolution of March 1999 condemning NATO
action received the support of only one other member of the Security Council, Namibia;
the remaining 12 members voted against it.45 This refusal to condemn however cannot
constitute an implicit authorization since Council members might acquiesce in an
unlawful action, yet not vote to approve it if given such an opportunity prior to its
initiation. The more hazardous implication of such a post-action ratification by the
Council is that it would encourage members to take illegal action with the expectation
that the Council will later acquiesce the same thereby providing the stamp of legal
authorization.46

(A) The message sent out…
With respect to the future of decision-making though what is more important is
the impression that survives the unilateral conduct undertaken by the NATO in its
deliverance of Kosovo.
43

See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (U.S. v.
Nicar.) (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1984, 392, 440.
44

Neither NATO nor the United States offered any legal justification for their action during the
Kosovo crisis. In the proceeding before the International Court of Justice on Yugoslavia's
complaint, only Belgium, of the ten NATO countries, mentioned humanitarian intervention as a
possible legal justification, see Jonathan Charney, Anticipating Humanitarian Intervention in
Kosovo, 32 VAND. J TRANS. L 1231, 1239 (1999). Even Belgium later stated its "hope that
resorting to force without the approval of the Security Council will not constitute a precedent",
see Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium at the
54th Assembly of the United Nations, 9 (available at: http://www.un.int/belgiu
m/speech_Minister_Michel_54UNGA_ENG.html). Others, such as the United States, referred to
violations of human rights in Kosovo and the need to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, yet did
not argue for a rule of international law that would justify NATO's action, see Lobel, supra note
20 at 33.
45

See Ramesh Thakur, The UN and Kosovo’s Challenge of “Humanitarian Intervention”
(available at http://www.isanet.org/archive/kosovoandun.html) [hereinafter Thakur].
46

See Lobel, supra note 20 at 31. This rationale for intervention receives a most unfortunate
endorsement from the International Court of Justice which in the Corfu Channel case noted that
since the right of forcible intervention in the name of international justice "has, in the past, given
rise to most serious abuses . . .From the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most
powerful states", Corfu Channel Case, 1949 ICJ Reports (Merits) 4, 35(1949). This however is
based on a faulty premise since the misuse of forcible intervention has more often than not been
done by such “most powerful States”.
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In India, a former Foreign Secretary noted: “If it is Iraq and Yugoslavia today, it
could very well be India tomorrow. This demonstrates convincingly the importance of
India’s nuclear deterrent.”47
Alexei G. Arbatov (deputy chair of the Russian State Duma (Parliament) Defense
Committee) summed up the lessons that Russia had learnt from the experience as being;
that the ends justifies the means, that the use of force is the most efficient problem solver,
if applied decisively and massively; that negotiations are of dubious value and should be
used as a cover for military action and finally, that devastation and collateral fatalities
among the civilian population are acceptable in order to limit one’s own casualties.48
What is possibly even more disturbing is the precedent set by the Kosovo incident
based on which it has been argued that NATO’s attack on Serbia may have effectively
expunged a Russian taboo against the use of military force in Chechnya.49 As flagrant as
this argument may sound, it holds good when tested against Kant’s “categorical
imperative” since the universal applicability of the rule would allow organizations like
the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS, with Russia as its hegemon],50 the
Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS, with Nigeria as its hegemon],51
or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC, with India as its
hegemon]52 to pursue regional security and intervention based on some similarly
customized and subjective thumb rule.53
47

See MUCHKUND DUBEY, The NATO Juggernaut: Logic of an Indian Defense Deterrent, The
Times of India (Delhi: 8 April 1999). See also Might on Show, The Times of India, (2 April 1999)
arguing that “The war unleashed by NATO against Serbia has implications for general staff
establishments the world over…The nations which want to retain their strategic autonomy and
sovereignty are left with no choice but to sustain their nuclear arsenals and go in for missiles and
try to develop RMA [the revolution in military affairs] capabilities for themselves”.

48

See Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned
from Kosovo and Chechnya (Washington DC: The George C. Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 20
July 2000), “Executive Summary,” v.
49

Id.

50

Dec.8, 1991 (Minsk) and Dec. 21, 1991 (Alma Mata); Text in (1992) 31 ILM 138. The Charter
was adopted on June 22, 1993; see (1995) 34 ILM 1279.

51

Formally established in 1975 (there was an earlier interim agreement of May 4, 1967, 5
U.N.T.S. 287, but the constituent body was extensively revised on Jule4, 1993; Final text in 35
(1996) 674).

52

Charter of the SSARC, Dec. 8 1985 (available at: www.south-asia.com/saarc/charted.html).

53

See Lobel, supra note 20 at 31 where the author cites the example of the atmosphere of
insecurity and doubt that was created regarding the Security Council, when the Nigeriandominated ECOWAS intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone to protect human rights and
democracy at the same time that the Nigerian dictatorship was violating those rights and
democratic principles at home. The Security Council's failure to explicitly authorize those
interventions may well have been linked to uneasiness about Nigeria's role, particularly in the
Sierra Leone case where Nigeria apparently misled the Council as to the nature of its operations.
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An adequate warning was provided in March 2002, when the members of the
Arab League [League]54 concluded that the anticipated attack on Iraq would be an act of
aggression. They further announced that any such attack would be treated as an attack on
each and every one of them.55 The phraseology of this statement is only too similar to the
founding principle of the NATO by which the members agree and accept that an “attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America” would be considered to be an
attack against them all.56
Proponents of the American hegemonic doctrine and members of the Dick
Cheney/Paul Wolfowitz school of thought will no doubt argue that the League lacks the
military power and political influence to undertake such a determination to any realistic
degree of success. However, their current strength or ability to follow through is not in
question. The question raised is whether the NATO’s unilateral determination and
consequent disproportional intervention into Kosovo in 1999 establishes an adequate
precedent/rule for the League to make its own determination that Israel is indeed guilty of
gross human rights violations against Palestinian citizens.57 Would it be acceptable to
NATO (with the US as its hegemon) if the League used this determination as a thumb
rule to intervene against Israel, in defense of the Palestinian peoples?58 The obvious
answer once again presents the face of collective exceptionalism that has been NATO’s
binding force for some time now.
All of this may seem like a conspiracy theory of sorts in the background of Luck’s
opinion that
“Historically, if one state appeared to be outstripping its neighbours and
competitors in terms of the core attributes of power, especially militarily, the
Other regional actions, such as the U.S.-dominated OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic,
the Organization of East Caribbean States/U.S. invasion of Grenada, and the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia, all raise the same hegemonic pretextual concerns.
54

Pact signed on March 22, 1945; text in (1945) 39 AJIL Supp. 266.

55

See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big
Invasion Next Year, N.Y.Times, (Apr. 28, 2002) at 1.
56

See Article V of the NATO treaty (43 AJIL 1949 Supp. 159)

57

“If this war [referring to President Bush’s war against terrorism] takes the form that affronts
moderate Arab opinion, if it has the air of a clash of civilizations, there is a strong risk that it will
contribute to Osama Bin Laden’s goal: a conflict between the Arab-Muslim world and the West”,
see Christopher S. Raj, Chintamani Mahapatra, US Strategic Response to Emerging Problems in
Asia, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Vol. 41, No. 3 (2004) 279 at 295 quoting the French daily Le
Monde, (September, 2001).
58

See Thakur, supra note 45, (“would [the US] accept former or present Israeli leaders being put
on trial for crimes against humanity by a tribunal that was set up essentially by the Arab League,
funded by them and dependent on them for collecting crucial evidence through national
intelligence assets and for enforcement of arrest warrants?”)
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others would react by…forming coalitions to counter the hegemon. But it
seems most likely that others by and large see the US as a relatively benign
hegemon, one which has little stomach or motivation for conquest and which
faces internal constraints on the sudden and capricious use of force.”59

The fallacy of the above stated argument however lies in the fact that the US (in
this case) is indeed not a “benign hegemon”.60 Neither does it lack the “stomach or
motivation” to pursue conquest nor does its foreign policy get bound by any such
“internal constraints on the sudden and capricious use of force”61 and this fact is only too
obvious to most nations. Thus the world is a little more the way Huntington sees it; as a
“transitional uni-polar period” characterized by a single superpower preferring unipolar
hegemony, and several regional powers that prefer a multipolar system wherein they
could restrain the superpower.62
59

See Luck, supra note 7 at 6. See also Fernando Reinares, The Empire Rarely Strikes Back,
FOREIGN POLICY (Jan./Feb., 2002) where the author contends, “Although terrorists attacked U.S.
interests more than 2,400 times between 1983 and 1998, the United States responded with overt
military action only three times.”
60

See Slavoj Zizek, Iraq’s False Promises, FOREIGN POLICY, (Jan/Feb 2004) 42 at 46, where he
argues that “The problem with today’s United States is not that it is a new global empire, but that,
while pretending to be an empire, it continues to act as a nation-state, ruthlessly pursuing its
interests”.

61

See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118: 7 HARV. L. REV. 2048 at 2054, 2057-58 (2005) where the authors contend that
“Congress need not declare war in order to provide its full authorization to the President to
prosecute a war”. This is followed by the argument that any authorization for the use of military
force is not truncated on the gorunds that the fight against terrorists is not a real war; rather “the
authority conferred [by the authorization of use of military force] does not depend on whether the
conflict meets some metaphysical test of war but rather on how the political branches view the
conflict and how they characterize the belligerents in it”. These arguments however are widely
disputed; see n. 32, 33 at 2058, citing not only the intent of the Founders but also the conduct of
previous U.S. Presidents contrary to the above stated argument. Contemporary literature on the
subject also disputes the legality of such executive arrogance for e.g. see, Bruce Ackerman The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263 (2004).
What is perhaps even more surprising is the Sept 18, 2001 Congress authorization to the
U.S. President to “use all necessary and appropriate force…to prevent future acts of
international terrorism against the U.S. by such nations, organization or persons”, see
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001),. [hereinafter
AUMF]. The AUMF was approved by both Houses of the Congress on Sept 14, 2001 and signed
by the President on the Sept 18, 2001. It was this unilateral and preemptive carte blanche that
trained U.S. might on Iraq----On Sept 20, 2001, President Bush declared “Our enemy is a radical
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them…”, see President George W.
Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept 20, 2001)
(available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
62

See Samuel Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 35 (Mar-Apr 1999).
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The obvious reason to explain the absence of a coalition to counter such a
hegemon (and its allies in the NATO) is the degree to which the international political
system is influenced and often manipulated by the hegemon and its allies.63 An example
63

The most recent instance of which is America’s declaration of Pakistan as being its major nonNATO ally in recognition of the latter’s services as a bounty hunter of sorts, arresting and
handing over more than 500 fugitives alleged to be part of the Al Quaeda and Taliban factions.
See U.S. to Designate Pakistan Non-NATO Ally, Reuters (posted: March 18th 2004), (available
at: http://wireservice.Wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=Breaking&storyId=837158). See also
US Boosts Pakistan Military Ties (available at: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world /south _a
sia/3522174.stm).
This designation has been accompanied by the lifting of all sanctions levied upon
Pakistan after Pervez Musharraf seized power in a 1999 bloodless coup; since September 11,
2001, the US has rewarded Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against terrorism by helping the
country reschedule its loans with international financial institutions, see “US assures Pakistan of
Immediate Debt Relief”, Dawn (Oct. 21st 2001). See also “US Lifts Musharraf Sanctions”, The
Telegraph, (March 26th 2004) (“the US President had last year announced a $3 billion economic
assistance package for Pakistan, including over a billion dollars to enable it to repay old leans.”)
See also B. RAMAN, “Murder and Machination in Pakistan’s backyard”, (July 9th 2003) (available
at: http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.php/200 307081252 40298) (The Pakistani conducted
arrest and handover of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed allegedly the chief of operations under Bin
Laden, charged with planning the attack of September 11th, was seen as the biggest catch of AlQuaeda. The performance earned President Musharraf accolades at Camp David and led to the
announcement of a $3 billion aid package from 2005).
To this extent there is the possibility of a deviation from Huntington’s description of how
the fault lines of civilizational conflict will be drawn between “the West and the rest”, (see
Huntington: Clash, supra note 37 at 22-49) since Pakistan’s newfound boldness in siding with the
US against Islamic militants within its territory is a prime example of the indecisiveness that
continues to plague Non-western unity. (See M. LAL GOEL, A Clash of Civilizations, speech
delivered at the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship of Pensacola, Florida (June, 2002) at 9,10 (on
file with the author) where he states “The quick eradication of the Bin Laden network in
Afghanistan has emboldened President Musharaff to move boldly against militants in his own
country. Musharraf would not have undertaken such a risky venture prior to 9/11. In the changed
environment he feels encouraged. The moderate Islamic intelligentsia has begun to speak up
against extremism”)
Pakistan as an Islamic theocracy could have served as a stronghold of an Islamic
resistance against the West. However the presence of the US as a negotiator in the Kashmir issue
has thus far precluded Pakistan’s siding against them, see generally ASHLEY J. TELLIS, C.
CHRISTINE FAIR, JAMISON JO MEDBY, LIMITED CONFLICT UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA:
INDIAN AND PAKISTANI LESSONS FROM THE KARGIL CRISIS, (Rand Coporation Publications,
2000) (available at: www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1450). Pakistan has consequently
attempted to balance its cultural allegiance with its foreign political interests for some time now,
see KATHERINE PFLEGER SHRADER, U.S. Lets Pakistan Lead al-Quaeda Hunt, The Guardian
(March 19th 2004) (available at: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1101590/posts) (“The
situation Musharraf faces is a delicate one, as he balances his desire to eliminate al-Quaeda and
its allies, who have found safety in the tribal areas of Pakistan, with opposition among his people
to the U.S.-led war on terror…Loren Thomson a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute…said
Musharaff is in a dangerous situation, under U.S. pressure and having survived two attempts on
his life by Islamic extremists, ‘He appears to be doing the bidding of the United States at a time
when U.S. standing in Pakistan is at a low ebb.’”) This new alliance however has shown adequate
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of this with regard to the NATO, is seen in the “Strategic Concept of the Alliance” which
was approved by the 19 members on its 50th anniversary (April, 1999).64This policy
essentially transforms the NATO from a Cold War collective security organization to
“…one that attaches more importance to political dimensions and expanded
geographical focus beyond NATO territory”.65 But in the course of its most ambitious
expansion throughout Europe66 (and even beyond through sub-alliances),67 the NATO
(and the US as a controlling authority within it) may have set a most dangerous precedent
and another significant oversight; in believing themselves to be god’s only children.

(III) A MORE DANGEROUS TWIN: The threat of a religious, cultural exceptionalism
Islam for instance, grew out from being a threatened belief in Mecca in 622 A.D.
(when Mohammed was forced to flee to Medina) to become a predominant international
force with boundaries that stretched from India (712 A.D.) to Spain (715 A.D.), all within
potential to become a cause of dangerous acrimony for Pakistan within the bounds of its own
Islamic community. See “Zawahiri Tape Urges Pervez Overthrow”, The Telegraph, (26th March
2004) (Dubai, March 25: Arabic Al Jazeera today aired a purported new tape of senior Al Quaeda
leader Ayman-al-Zawahri proclaiming ‘I call on Muslims in Pakistan to get rid of their of their
government which is working for Americans.’); PETER MAASS, Dirty War, NEW REPUBLIC (11th
Nov. 2002) at 18 (“Arbitrary arrests and executions carried out by unloved governments at the
bidding of the unloved United States, can lead to those governments being replaced by ones that
support the terrorists instead”); Dexter Filkins, “As Pakistani Popularity Slides, ‘Busharaf’ Is a
Figure of Ridicule”, New York Times, 5th July 2002, A1. See also KANCHAN LAKSHMAN, Deep
Roots to Pakistan’s Sectarian Terror, (July 8th 2003) (available at: http://www.pakistanfacts.com/article.php/200307081252 40298) (“The incident [involving a successful suicide
bombing in Quetta] comes in the wake of increasing Islamist fundamentalist/extremist opposition
to his regime's current engagement with the United States. Islamists may have intended to send a
message regarding their uneasiness with Musharraf's current agenda.”) See generally RAMSEY
CLARKE, Divide and Conquer, The Destruction of the Balkan Federation by the United States
and NATO, (Nov 3rd 2003) (available at: http://www.Iacenter.Org /yugo/div ide&conquer.htm).
64

See “The Alliance Strategic Concept”, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April24, 1999
(available at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm). This agreement effectively redefines
the Cold War alliance’s mission to address a wide range of potential threats (including regional
threats) ranging from WMD proliferation to international terrorism.

65

See Dingli Shen, Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?, 27:2 THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY, (Spring 2004), 165 at 168.
66

See Thakur, supra note 45 describing the NATO’s triple transformation policy i.e. enlargement
of membership, an eastward expansion of geographical borders, and a change of role from
collective defense of member-states against armed attack from a non-member, to a more diffuse
role of peace maintenance throughout Europe.
67

See US Boosts Pakistan Military Ties (available at: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world /south _a
sia/3522174.stm) (“In effect, Pakistan now joins a club of 10 or so militarily most-favoured
nations that include Israel, Egypt and Jordan among them.”)
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the next century.68 This wave of conquest continued three centuries later with the
overrunning of Anatolia (Turkey, 1071), Delhi (1201) and Constantinople (1453); to the
growing numbers of followers of Islam, these victories against the greatest of odds
represented God’s pleasure at them and his displeasure at the non-believers. It gave them
boundless faith in their cause leading to the creation of one of the most dangerous
exceptionalist beliefs to have ever come into existence.69 The primary tenet of Islamic
theology is “La Ilaha Ill Allah, wa Anna Mohammed Ar-Rasul Allah” which translates to
“there is no other God but Allah, and Mohammed is the messenger of Allah”.70 This
represents a linear stream of thought most susceptible to exceptionalist tendencies
especially in the face of an openly corruptive influence coupled with military aggression
from the west.
Some of the crucial questions that need answering at this stage would be---is there
not enough authority (by way of precedent) for Islamic groups to act unilaterally in
defense of their security interests; will diplomatic considerations (i.e. the rule observed
by Pakistan, Jordan and Bahrain) survive the fervor that accompanies a cultural
confidence (that norm in say, Iran)? Will the buffers created by the West (in bestowing
upon four Islamic strongholds, the charge of ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’)71 prove an
adequate safety net to prevent or (in the worst case) outlast an Islamic resurgence? The
censure displayed by Jordan at the assassination of the spiritual leader of the Hamas--Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 72 and King Abdullah’s consequent hasty departure from the

68

Mohammed himself captured Mecca before 632 A.D. Within 2 years of this, Muslim raiders
had defeated and thereby conquered the Persian and Byzantium empires (the two most powerful
empires in existence at the time). See DANIEL PIPES, In the Path of God: Islam and Political
Power, Voice of India (Delhi, 2001) [hereinafter Pipes] where the author states that the “It
seemed that, armed with faith of Allah, nothing could stop the soldiers of Islam.”
69

“Islam’s rapid rise from obscurity to international empire had a touch of the miraculous for
Muslims; how could they have attained all this without the God’s approval and support”, Id. The
danger in Islamic exceptionalism may be even more severe since it is seemingly divinely
ordained as opposed to its American counterpart, which stems from a way of life.

70

See M. Lal Goel, A Clash of Civilizations, speech delivered at the Unitarian Universalist
Fellowship of Pensacola, Florida (June, 2002) at 6 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Goel]

71

Title 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 2350a (Nunn Amendment 1987), authorizes the Secretary of Defense
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to designate Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA)
for purposes of the code. See Praful Bidwai, Manufacturing Saffron Support, FRONTLINE, Vol.
21:7 (March 21-April 9, 2004) (available at: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2107/stories/2004040900
4811 900.htm).
72

See “Jordan Condemns Yassin Assassination”, Petra News Agency, 22nd March, 2004
(available at: http://www.jorda nembassyus.Org/0 3222004001.htm).
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United States in dissent73 of the US’s condoning the killing74 is possibly one instance of
the gaps in the Western buffer strategy.
The appreciable danger in this arises from the probability that an Islamic
resurgence would flow primarily from a heightened anxiety within the community on the
issue of a threat to their culture and way of life.75 This is possibly the most lethal and
uncontrollable form of exceptionalism, one that arises to protect community value
systems. History is testament to the Russian, Chinese revolutions and the Nazi conquests
during the Second World War which saw the return, in a magnified form, of the kind of
brutality that characterized the religious wars of the sixteenth century, for what was at
73

See “Jordan King Signals Rift with US”, BBC News-World Edition, 20th April, 2004 (available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3641099.stm) (“King Abdullah of Jordan has
postponed talks with US President George W Bush on Wednesday amid concern over America's
support for Israeli policy.”); “King Condemns the Assassination of Hamas Leader”, Petra News
Agency, 22nd March, 2004 (available at: http://www.jordanembass yus.org/03222004009.htm).
74

See “US vetoes UN measure on Yassin's death”, CHINAdaily, 26th March, 2004 (available at:
http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/26/content_318213.htm), quoting the U.S.
Ambassador John Negroponte, "This Security Council does nothing to contribute to a peaceful
settlement when it condemns one party's actions and turns a blind eye to everything else
occurring in the region". (The vote was 11 countries in favor, three countries abstaining, and one
country against — the United States); See also “U.S. says it's ‘deeply troubled’ by Yassin
killing…But White House doesn't condemn Israel outright”, MSNBC News, March 22 nd ,
2004 (available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4579 005/). See also “World fears after
Yassin killing”, BBC News—UK Edition, 22nd March, 2004 (available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_eas t/3556559. stm) (“The Bush administration said it
was deeply troubled by the assassination, though it stopped well short of condemning it.”)
75

“Terrorist leaders tell young men that the reason they feel humiliated---personally and
culturally---is that international institutions like the IMF, World Bank and the UN are imposing
capitalism and secular ideas on them with the aim of exterminating traditional values”, see
JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD---Why Islamic Militants Kill?, 283 (2003)
[hereinafter Stern]. This anxiety is not a new emotion. Frustrated by the largely unidirectional
surge of cultural infiltration into its territory, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to block out
television programming through the implementation of a statute (in 1994), which disallowed the
use of Satellite Programme Receivers within the territory of the State. This extreme form of
restrictive State action was primarily motivated by the belief that:
“They [the West] wish to impoverish us and to impose the wrong and
hollow culture of the West, which deprives people of any kind of
humanity.... The bulk of the enemy onslaught against us, against our brave
nation, is a cultural onslaught…”
See Majlis Official Comments on Bill Banning Use of Satellite Programme Receivers, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 20, 1994, LEXIS, News Library, BBCMIR File (excerpting
weekly radio programme, entitled "The Nations House," on December 18, 1994 and broadcast on
the Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran), quoted in PAUL D. CALLISTER, The Internet, Regulation
and the Market for Loyalties: An Economic Analysis of Transboundary Information Flow, (2002)
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 59 at note 127.
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stake was not just territory and resources, but the value systems and ways of life of entire
populations.76
Prudence also requires one to be mindful of the fact that the history of Islamic
propagation tells a tale of vengeful crusades and systematic proselytization all of which
arise from a sense of innate cultural righteousness, the duty of god’s own children as it
were.77 The heat of this emotion is so smelting that it spares no one, not even its own
people who in the eyes of the resurgence may have swayed from the ideals of the original
austere Islamic faith78 which gives them the locus to be exceptional.79
Present day western virtues will on the other hand, not blindly allow the State to
pursue activities in violation of the general principles of civil, political rights and
liberties. The all-pervasive principles of transparency, public participation and
democratic governance structures ensure the protection of the public from governmental
extremism.80 These self-imposed checks on not only the domestic functioning of the State
76

See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, 11 (1992) [hereinafter
Fukuyama].

77

Possibly the best instances of such unbounded Islamic exceptionalism can be seen in its spread
across Europe with the Crusades and the overrunning of Hijaz by the Wahhabi resurgence of
1924, see TARIQ ALI, THE CLASH OF FUNDAMENTALISMS, 75, 76 (2003) [hereinafter Tariq].
While the earlier Wahhabi conquests of the Shammar region in 1915-1917 might be explained by
the pro-Ottoman attitude of the ruling Al Rashid family; and the occupation of the districts of
Abha in Asir might also be represented as a ‘matter of domestic policy’ and as the settling of
unsolved border problems, the occupation of virtually international areas around the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina required an entirely different rationale, especially in view of the fact that both
the Hijaz and the Najd had concluded a defense treaty with the United Kingdom and received
considerable subsidies under its terms. Thus, throwing up such a blatant defiance in the face of
the world’s greatest colonizer required something more than mere military strength; an
unquestioning belief that their actions were guaranteed and held safe by divine will. A belief with
which “…they advanced at some speed towards Mecca, plundered the city and destroyed all the
symbols of the ‘heathen’ practices of the Meccans’”, see REINHARD SCHULZE, A MODERN
HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 69, 70 (2000).
78

Sayyid Qutub (considered by many to be the father of modern Islamic extremism), targeted
secular Arab leaders (because he found them to be “arrogant, corrupt, Westernized princes and
autocrats”) through a jihad, finding support for his condemnation of them in the writings of IbnTaymiyya, a 13th century theologian and jurist who wrote that jihad against Muslim unbelievers
was a legitimate means of protecting the purity of the faith. Outub described internal jihad as a
necessary component of the permanent evolution of the Islamic movement. See RUDOLPH
PETERS, JIHAD IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN ISLAM, 44 (1996) [Hereinafter Peters]
79

The writings of Sayyid Qutub and the Muslim Brotherhood (for which he became the
spokesman) inspired not only the Egyptian Islamic Jihad but many of the present day Islamic
terrorists like the Al Quaeda and the Hamas, see Stern, supra note 75 at 46.

80

An example of this is the much debated exclusionary principle used in U.S criminal procedure:
Since its inception in Weeks v. U.S. (1914) (232 U.S. 383) the principle has been a guardian of the
4th and 5th amendments (see Justice Black dissenting in Mapp v. Ohio, (1961) 367 U.S. 643 at
662), as a guarantee of privacy (see Olmstead v. U.S. (1928) 277 U.S. 438 at 478), as necessary to
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but also its foreign policy and international conduct, serve to significantly limit the extent
to which exceptional activities may be pursued by the State.81 This weakness of any
modern, democratically structured member of the international community does not exist
in the case of States or communities that derive their requisite legitimacy from a religious
ideology or divine right.82 While a democracy remains weakened in its effort to preserve
a sphere of individual rights (which significantly delimit the state’s powers), such
authoritarian (ideologically or by religious/cultural fervor) regimes have the option of
sacrificing specific aspects of individual rights and freedoms to facilitate the greater
purpose for which they exist. 83
This cultural/religious basis of Islamic exceptionalism provides its actions with
more endurance and less regard for the western social ideals of liberty and equality that
the West has to uphold, at least in principle.84 This redundancy of social accountability or
assure the accused of a fair trial (see Justice Frankfurter in Irvine v. California (1954) 347 U.S.
128 at 148) and a vanguard of the standard better known as the ‘imperative of judicial integrity’
whereby the government cannot take advantage of its own failings (Elkins v. U.S. (1960) 364 U.S.
206 at 217). Another instance is provided by Fareed Zakaria when he argues that democracy
without the protections of constitutional liberalism and due process, is a farce, see FAREED
ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM, 17-19 (London, 2003) [Hereinafter Zakaria].
81

See Fukuyama, supra note 76 at 9, where the author states, “They [Democracies] are
hamstrung by their very democratic nature: by the plurality of their voices, the self-doubt and
self-criticism that characterize democratic debate”. Thus a state which avoids such interventions
into its functioning would be stronger than a democracy and consequently free to map out its
foreign policy without the hindrance which in the opinion of Tocqueville plagues democracies.
See also JEAN FRANCOIS REVEL, How Democracies Perish, 17 (New York: 1983) [hereinafter
Revel], where the author continues the criticism originally made popular by Tocqueville, “As
things stand, relatively minor causes of discontent corrode, disturb, unsettle, paralyze, the
democracies faster and more deeply…[than Communist regimes], whose subjects have no real
rights or means of redressing their wrongs. Societies of which permanent criticism is an integral
feature are the only livable ones, but they are also the most fragile”. Even though Revel uses the
argument in the context of communist society, the analogy would hold good for an Islamic state
which denies western democratic processes to its citizens.
82

The Wahhabi movement for instance, began in the early 18th century with the coalition of
Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab and the martial strength of Muhammad Ibn-Saud, whereby Saud
became the emir—the political leader while Wahhab took on the role of a sheik (the religious
leader). This new found “religious legitimacy” allowed a fatwa to be issued against all nonWahhabis because Saud’s forces were “no longer a mob of traveling thugs and his victims were
no longer innocent people. Now Ibn-Saud’s goons were ‘fighters for jihad’ authorized to murder
‘unbelievers’”, see Abdul Hadi Palazzi, “Orthodox Islamic perceptions of Jihad and Martyrdom”
cited in Stern supra note 75 at 315, n.13.

83

See Fukuyama, supra note 76 at 15.

84

See Klein, supra note 29 at 17-45, where the author discusses the Asian cultural relativist
argument against the universal applicability of international human rights standards as
represented by ‘western’ codifications such as the UDHR and the ICCPR.
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responsibility towards democratic values and civil, political rights in the eyes of the
Islamic exceptionalist provides him with more than enough elbow room to identify and
persecute members even within his own community85 if their actions or opinions are seen
to contradict or differ from the austere edicts of Islamic virtue.86

(A) The Changing dimensions of “enemy”
An extension of this problem that needs to be acknowledged is the legal
personality of the actors through whom Islamic exceptionalism is conveyed. While
international law has always been strict about the status of its actors,87 present day
conflicts bypass such a rationale of restricting the law only to nation States.88 The actors
perpetuating invasions, armed attacks and so on are very often not states but non-state
actors like militia, which may or may not be state endorsed.89 The pervasion of
technology and information has led to an overall decentralization of power, which has
trickled down so far that there is what Fareed Zakaria calls a “democratization of
violence” whereby an individual non-state actor has the capacity to effectively attack
States.90 This situation is far worsened by international law’s state centric approach
85

The fervor of Wahhabism (attempting to replace orthodox Islam with their puritanical doctrine)
was so severe that a jihad was proclaimed against the Ottoman Empire whose Sultan was
considered the heir of the prophet Muhammad and the highest Islamic authority, see Stern, supra
note 75 at 68.

86

See Peters, supra note 78, The Wahhabiya resurgence brought on by the austere religious
beliefs of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and propagated by the military strength of the bandit
Emir – Muhammad Ibn Saud spread rapidly, conquering areas where it felt the original edicts of
Islam had been corrupted by idol worship, shrines and gravestones (the Wahhabi movement
rejected all forms of religious ostentation since all Muslims are equal before Allah). In its stride,
the Saudi-Wahhabi forces conquered and subjugated Najd (1745-45), Riyadh, Kharj and Qasim
(1792), Karbala (1801) where they looted and killed 5000 people, destroying homes and shrines
alike. In 1802 they occupied Taif (where they massacred the population) and Mecca (1803)
(where they instructed the Sharif to destroy the tombs of the Prophet and the Caliphs), see TARIQ,
supra note 77.
87

See SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS, 21 (Viva Books: New
Delhi, 2005). See also ALLAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY, 30 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
88

See Gregor Noll, Force, Partisanship, Dislocation: An essay on International Law in the State
of the Exceptional, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (JARNA
PETMAN and JAN KLABBERS eds.) (Martti Koskenniemi, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden,
2003) 207 at 213. [Hereinafter Noll]
89

Id. (where the author states “Yet, as long a the non-state actor manager to hide behind third
states, and remains on their territory, the question imposes itself against whom to exercise right
to self-defense. Going for the non-state perpetrators would need the consent of the government on
whose territory they are present.”)

90

See Zakaria, supra note 80 at 16.
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which often fails to adequately address non-state actors who may have liberated
themselves from the restraints of a particular territory and consequently operate through a
globalized form of warfare. The resulting asymmetric warfare leads one to wonder just
how unfair the U.S. doctrine (allowing the pre-emptive use of force)91 happens to be. Can
the UN system with its state centric premise still provide security for all? The precedents
set for exceptional unilateralism on the part of the western states, the attempts and
aspirations of other states/sub-state groups to use the same (for their own ends or to
counter a perceived western imperialism) and the increased involvement of non-state
actors (as conduits of such counter exceptionalism), creates a situation where not only the
personality of the parties, the merits of their actions but the morality and usefulness of the
law itself comes into question.92
While it is perhaps still too early to condemn the working of the UN system, this
present challenge to its veracity may be used to draw up two scenarios:
The first, is one where unilateral actions (for instance, the doctrine of pre-emptive
force) get legitimized as an option to any state (or to some states only), and where the
complex mechanism of pacific settlement of disputes, prohibition against the use of force,
non-intervention are subverted; where exceptionalism gets labelled as nationalism or
democratic intervention on the one hand and terrorism on the other. The second, is where
the international order embarks on a return to the Charter paradigm of international
relations and provides states with the initiative to formulate foreign policies aimed at selfimprovement with due regard for the principles of sovereign equality and nonintervention.

(IV) IMAGINING ENDGAMES: Is this the end of the Charter Paradigm?
Firstly, while a doctrinal approach to international law would make it fairly easy to
denounce the legality of the former scenario, the question of fairness is a different issue.
Leaving aside ambitions of abject expansionism; how does a proud, efficient, ‘free’, State
defend itself against unnamed armies/militia, for whose actions, no state takes
responsibility?93 How does it counter a challenge to its proud existence a challenge other
than to leave a message on the door stressing its intent to use pre-emptive force94 if
91

In situations where the state faces unknown enemies whose presence, movement and actions it
cannot predict of even reliably acknowledge, the readiness to resort to the pre-emptive selfdefense would serve to greatly increase the credibility of a threat levied by the state against such
potential threats. See Id. at 8.

92

See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, FOR REASONS OF STATE, 19, 20 (2003).

93

See Lawrence Freedman, War, FOREIGN POLICY (July/August, 2003) at 16 (where the author
contends that “All Future Warfare Will Be Asymmetric”).
94

In the run up to the 2004 Presidential election, candidate John Kerry countered allegations that
under his leadership, the U.S. would have to pass a “global test” to use preemptive strike, by
arguing that he would reserve "the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the United
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necessary? The obvious problem with this of course is that not only does it wash away
the structure of multilateral/consensus based security systems but also that, in a sense, it
will perpetuate conflict. While a state’s aggression may be called its exceptionalism,
similar actions undertaken by a militia would be labelled fanatic terrorism. Gregor Noll,
speaks of how
“Unlike the conventional enemy (in an interstate war), terrorists represent an
‘absolute enemy’ in the Schmittian sense, and the struggle against it is
informed by the logic of annihilation”.95

His reasoning (alluding to Schmitt’s categorization of a ‘just enemy’ and an
‘absolute enemy’)96 neglects the ‘partisan’ whose conduct may have been initiated in
protection of his home territory (i.e. of a “telluric character”)97but whose ambitions are
fuelled further by a religious/cultural/political or economic exceptionalism98 which
provides them with a global agenda99 (as evidenced by an “increased intensity of political
States," see Dana Milbank, “Bush Says Kerry Will Allow Foreign Vetoes”, Washington Post, (3rd
October, 2004), A08 (available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29332004Oct2.html) . See also Bill Van Auken, “Bush-Kerry debate: Two Candidates Committed to
War”, World Socialist Website (1st October 2004) (available at: http:// www.wsws.org/article
s/2004/oct2004/deba-o01.shtml).
95

See Noll, supra note 88 at 219 citing Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen:
Zwischenbemerkungen zum Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin: 1963) at 91-96.
96

Schmitt distinguishes between the partisan who is defending home territory and the
revolutionary partisan with a global agenda. The former needs not construct the enemy as an
absolute one, to be vanquished in annihilation, but is content with the eviction of the enemy from
the ‘occupied territory’. The latter however needs to go further and portrays the enemy in
absolute terms, which equals victory with annihilation. See Noll, supra note 88 at 218, nt. 29.

97

Id. at 9 where the author cites Schmitt’s definition of Telluric character as: “at large, the
authentic partisan is in a defensive situation, committed to the defence of the home territory”.
Such a definition I feel may be allowed to include a partisan who fights not only in the defence of
his territory but also for the culture, values and life style associated with it (for instance Islamic
extremist groups).
98

See Stern, supra note 75 at 265 (“The twin purpose of jihad is to cleanse Islam…and to fight
against the West using political, economic and religio-cultural weapons…”).

99

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad for instance, was created with the local agenda of upholding
Islamic rights in Egypt by converting it into an Islamic state. However, in later years, sustenance
of the group demanded the broadening of its agenda to cover and thereby counter global threats to
the Islamic faith. Thus upon merging with Osama Bin Laden’s network, Zawahiri described the
new mission of his group (now the core of the Al Quaeda) as a “global battle” against the
“unbelievers” who have “united against the mujahideen”. He adds, “the battle cannot be fought
on a regional level without taking account of the global hostility towards us”, see Stern, supra
note 75 at 266-267.
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commitment”).100This combination is possibly the most accurate description of the
contemporary exceptional, be it a State or a military group. While the Al Quaeda, the
Taliban took up arms in defence of their faith/culture (be it Wahhabism or another
interpretation of Islam) and proceeded to take the heat to the shores of their ‘absolute
enemies’, the US in turn exacted their pound of flesh in defence of their freedoms and
pillars of economic and social progress by flattening the contours of Afghanistan.
Whether or not the driving the Taliban out of power was a deed worth the effort is a
different issue, but the natural consequence of this war abroad has been the creation of a
license to continue it. Thus to allow States to proceed along these lines would only serve
to feed a general trend of illegality in international relations.101
To submit and surrender the rule of law to this “zone of indistinction between law
and violence”102 created by a “war against terrorism” would be to hand over the world
system to fear, unilateralism, vengeance and an overall state of exception. The war in Iraq
gives a glimpse of a future where the “zone of indistinction” will become the norm and an
argument for the enforcement of the rule of law through multilateralism will be an
exception.
A second prong of this argument (for allowing unilateral action in international
law) is found in Thomas H. Lee’s challenge to the utility of the “sovereign equality of
States” premise, when he writes that
“First, it is difficult to prove that [international] stability results from
sovereign equality per se as opposed to other system-level structural
variables like the balance of power among the most powerful states…Second,
whatever might be true of the multipolar or bipolar past, it is questionable
how much sovereign equality can contribute to stability in our presumptive
world of unipolarity and increasingly influential non-state actors.”103

100

See Noll, supra note 88, where the author cites Schmitt’s definition of a partisan with
‘increased intensity of political commitment’ as one who “has entered the realm of absolute
hostility, in which interplay of terror and counter terror culminates in annihilation”.
101

Id. at 216 where the author admits that “Partisan warfare evokes partisan warfare even in the
theatre of legitimacy”, thereby leaving little room for objective judgment or placing of
responsibility.

102

Id. at 217 where the author uses the instance of the Guantanamo Bay prison facility in Cuba
(used by the U.S. to house suspected Al Quaeda terrorists denying them the legal status of
Prisoners of War) as being symbolic of a paradigm shift towards a state’s replication of irregular
partisan warfare.

103

See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War:
The Vitality of Sovereign State Equality in a Unipolar World, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
153 (August 2004). [Hereinafter Lee]
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While it is true to say that a number of facets of international relations and
diplomacy may influence international stability, even the balance of power (between
“powerful states”) and the restrictions on its exercise are maintained through the principle
of multilateral decision-making,104 which in turn draws its legitimacy from the ideal of
sovereign equality of states.105
It may be less than fair to say that all of international law is built on
multilateralism: it is very much a system wherein the law is ordinarily implemented by
states acting collectively and individually;106 to hold otherwise (i.e. to say that all inter104

The unilateral exercise of “Westphalian sovereignty” has been greatly restricted by what Ann
Marie Slaughter describes as the “ineffectiveness” and “interference” challenges, see Ann Marie
Slaughter, Sovereignty, Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN J. INTL. L. 283 at 284
(2004), where the author quotes Keohane (with regard to the first challenge)—“It is now a
platitude that the ability of governments to attain their objectives through individual action has
been undermined by international political and economic interdependence” and argues (with
regard to the latter challenge) “the letter of Article 2(7) remains; the sprit is violated repeatedly
and increasingly routinely. All of Human Rights law deliberately infringes on the domestic
jurisdiction of every state, denying governments the freedom to torture, murder, and
‘disappear’…their own citizens. Moreover, throughout the 1900’s the Security Council
repeatedly found that the conditions prevailing within a state, from starvation in Somalia to
political intimidation and massacre in East Timor, a threat to international peace and security
sufficient to require collective armed intervention…States can no longer assume that if they
refrain from interfering in the affairs of other states, they will remain free from interference
themselves” [hereinafter Slaughter]. See also Cuellar, supra note 4, (“…the US and its Allies
supported the creation of an institutional arrangement that was supposed to make unprecedented
contributions to collective international security. The UN Charter was central to that
arrangement.”)
105

It is for this reason that sovereign equality is vehemently guarded by states for it gives them
the standing to expect and contest for “basic protections---such as the prohibition of conquest and
the preclusion of non-consensual obligations---that help preserve their independence in
international affairs,” see Byers, supra note 7 at 176. The acceptance of sovereign equality has
allowed states to deny to the U.S. its desired “special responsibilities” (in international security)
with regard to the 1998 Rome Statue on the International Criminal Court, see David J. Scheffer,
The US and the International Criminal Court, AM. J. INTL. L. 93 (1999) 12 at 18-19. The
principle also explains how (in the post Kosovo period) 130 states of the G77 were able to adopt
declarations (twice) explicitly labeling unilateral intervention as illegal under international law,
see Ministerial Declaration, 23rd Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
Group of 77, Sept. 24th 1999, (www.g77.org/Docs/Dec/Decl.1999.html), para 69; Declaration of
the Group of 77, South Summit, Havana, Cuba, April 10-14th, 2000, (www.g77.org/Docs/Declara
tion/G77Summit.htm), para 54.
106

This is to say that it is not unprecedented for states to acquiesce to unilateral action or even
endorse its incorporation into larger multilateral legal systems. For instance, “within a purely
consensual system, there is nothing to stop 190 states…from according one state more or
different rights than others”, see Byers, supra note 7 at 174 where he cites the UN Security
Council (which allows the “veto” to the “permanent members”) and the World Bank, IMF (which
incorporate “weighted voting, whereby rich states have more say than poorer states”) as
contemporary examples of consensual inequality.
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state relations are controlled by multilateralism) would be to stretch sovereignty far too
thin.107 However, the mandate of multilateralism is most certainly established with regard
to customary norms108 and those of peremptory importance or jus cogens,109 which
clearly make multilateral action the ground rule,110and try to avoid their foisting upon a
political or ideological minority, for in the long run, it would significantly devalue the
concept.111 What is basic to any such peremptory norm is that once “accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted”, it can be “modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character”.112 Thus, in as much as peremptory norms
of international law (for instance, the “use of force” and “non-intervention”) are
concerned, the premise of sovereign equality forms the basis for mandatory and binding
multilateralism.
Moreover, the value of sovereign equality against the backdrop of asymmetric
warfare and unrecognized non-state actors is found in the need to ensure that Iraq does
not recur; to safeguard the territorial integrity of nations. Without this assurance of formal
107

However, the all too obvious paradigm shift towards multilateral governance is expressed
accurately by Slaughter, supra note 104 at 285 when she concludes---“States can only govern
effectively by actively cooperating with other states and by collectively reserving the power to
intervene in other states’ affairs”.
108

See Byers, supra note 7 at 175 where he argues that “Exceptional rights are even more rare in
customary international law, where rules are derived from a combination of state practice and
opinion juris (i.e. a belief in the existence of the relevant obligation) and widespread support or
acquiescence is required for any legal change”. See generally, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7-10 (6th ed., OUP: 2003) (1966) [Hereinafter Brownlie].
109

See Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 23rd May, 1969, UN DOC
A/CONF. 39/28; 8 ILM 679 (1980) 6,7 (which provides that a treaty will be void “if, at the time
of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”) [hereinafter
VLT]
110

See Shaw, supra note 15 at 97 where the author explains that a most stringent, “two stage
process” is involved in the establishment of jus cogens, in the light of Art. 53 of the VLT: “first,
the establishment of the proposition as a rule of general international law and secondly the
acceptance of that rule as a peremptory norm by the international community”, because “the
establishment of a higher level of binding rules has serious implications for the international law
community”.
111

For this reason, the appropriate test would require universal acceptance of the proposition as a
legal rule by states and recognition of it as a rule of jus cogens by an overwhelming majority of
states, crossing ideological and political divides, see IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION
nd
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, (2 ed. Manchester, 1984) 218-224. This is also the reason that in
U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, (71 F. 3d. 754, 764 n.4 (9th Circuit 1995)) it was expressly noted that
jus cogens norms are “…binding on all nations, and cannot be preempted by treaty” to prevent
scattered interests from affecting its status as law.
112

See VLT, supra note 109.
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equality and also the promise of equal treatment before the law, international cooperation
would become a myth. The need for sovereign equality, I would stress, is more than ever
before; for in its absence international armed conflict and inter-state war would become
inevitable.
In furtherance of the same contention, Lee alludes to the “meaningful
participation” by non-permanent members of the Security Council like Germany and
Japan as being illustrative of an efficient system even in the absence of formal legal
equality.113 This argument however neglects situations where the permanent members
exercise their power-based veto’s to block the interests of other states or competing
“oligarchies”. In the immediate post-WWII period, the veto was a recognized
compromise on the part of states to ensure the cooperation of stronger state parties; its
function being to place the burden to prevent conflict on those who held the power to
cause large-scale international disturbance. To expect states to compromise yet again and
this time to concede to an entirely different system of treatment before the rule of law
would be to ask them to give away their sovereignty, not to an international organization
but to another “supreme” state. This is a system, which subordinates one state to another
and opens up a Pandora’s Box whereby the supreme state can legitimately proceed to
pursue its interests even to the detriment of other states. The claim that the unipole would
measure out its conduct so as not to tilt the balance (of allegiance owed by weaker states)
in favour of competing “oligarchies”114is also suspect, firstly because the larger premise
behind this new system is that the interest of the supreme state is weighed over those of
others and the rule has been modified to suit its needs; and secondly because, a conflict of
interests between this supreme and other states (oligarchies or otherwise) would
immediately polarize the international community, creating blocks as the solution when
there remains no remedy to be found in equal treatment before the law.
For all the conviction used to challenge the principle of sovereign equality, it
needs to be realized that in as much as it may be a legal fiction, its presence is essential
because the sense of security that comes with it permeates through and holds together the
fabric of international relations.
The argument against sovereign equality seeks to creation exceptions within the
law (to make room for exceptionalism on the part of some states) by introducing riders
like “except for the United States and its citizens” into every international legal obligation
or organization to which the U.S. has objected.115 This course of reasoning, according to
Lee would allow “the project of international law” to advance considerably, since the US
would have no reason to “object to international law and no other state could use the
United States’ defection from a generally binding rule as precedent for its own
defection”.116While asymmetric conflict does indeed pose a credible threat to a nation
113

See Lee, supra note 103 at 154.
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Id. at 150.
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bound by a state-centric notion of multilateral international law, which does not
recognize non-state actors and their motivations, the wisdom of allowing individual state
(/s) to chalk out their own methods of preemption is questionable.
It is questionable, because it would be an explicit move towards a power-oriented
system of international relations as opposed to the rule-oriented system promoted for the
better part of a century now.117 While almost all of international relations and diplomacy
has been based on some permutation of the two,118 to “modify the rule just enough to fit
the facts, to ensure that the act [of exceptionalist interventionism or preemptive use of
force] will be lawful [for only a certain “supreme state”] in the future”,119would be to
establish a rationale that expressly endorses a power based mechanism and denounces the
pragmatic sanctity of rules in international law. Since other states would oppose the
establishment of a Unipolar to whom the normal rules don’t apply, the next issue would
be with regard to the superiority or inferiority of some states to others before the rule of
law.
The move towards the active acknowledgement of a “supreme” state, and thereby
“lesser” states, would necessitate a reevaluation not only of international cooperation but
also the legitimacy of custom as a universally binding principle of international law.
What then would international custom evolve through? The conduct of the supreme or
that of the other states. If the former, then how strictly would it be enforced against others
and would defenses like the “persistent objector”120 hold up against the mandate of this
supreme? And if the latter, then how far would it actually be able to bind and transcend
the admittedly exceptional interests of the former?
Owing to these and a myriad of other uncertainties, unilateral actions by “supreme
state” aspirants have in the recent past met with the thorough disapproval of the
international community creating a situation of distrust and diminished diplomatic
influence on the part of such state(/s). Riding on its exceptionalist high, the West has
made a few dangerous assumptions: It has used military/economic power and political
influence to further its ‘national interests’ to the extent of alienating its peers121 and it
117

See JOHN. H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: Law and Policy of International
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may well be underestimating the intensity of actions that can follow from a sense of
cultural exceptionalism (as opposed to one that arises to further economic and political
convictions).122 Much like a dictator, a present day “supreme” state would need the
legitimacy granted by its peers to be able to hold sway; this is severely damaged by a
intentional disregard of their positions.
Indeterminacies like these lead us to consider other more viable options.

(V) CONCLUSION: SAN FRANCISCO OR WESTPHALIA--Going back to where its safe
The second scenario is one in which this miasma between law and violence is resisted
and the UN’s approach to international relations is used to modify the behaviour of
individual States and regional alliances to bring them in line with the restrictions that the
Charter places on the classical Westphalian notion of international law.123 This conscious
to the U.S. for trial without a commitment to waive capital punishment). Similarly, even the UK
and Spain (U.S. allies in the war against terrorism) have maintained their reluctance to extradite
terrorists (and even Osama Bin Laden in the event of his capture by British forces) unless the
death penalty is waived, see Stern, supra note 75 at 290. Germany and France have similarly
shown reluctance to hand over information against Zacarias Moussaoui regarding his
involvement in the September 11th attacks, for fear that he would face the death penalty if
convicted in the U.S., see Peter Finn, “Germany Reluctant to Aid Protection of Moussaoui”,
Washington Post (11th June 2002). Since, international cooperation is crucial to the effectiveness
of U.S. antiterrorism policies, transnational disagreements on issues like the treatment of
detainees assume enormous importance. Routine aspects of transnational law enforcement have
been complicated by the controversy. For instance, since the prisoners at Guantanamo are
nationals of several co-belligerent states, the controversy has triggered diplomatic disputes
between the United States and several important allies in the war against terrorism (including the
United Kingdom and Australia), see KOH, supra note 28 at 1479 (2003). See also Manooher
Mofidi & Amy Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of
Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 59 (2003).
122
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must be resisted at every level. See also Stern, Id. at 112-113, 275 where she argues that Islamic
terrorists see liberalism and the western Capitalist construction of society as the cause of the
conflict. However, even the U.S. has on occasion traced its freedoms to religion and declared that
they are “not the grant of an government or document, but…our endowment from God”, see Dan
Eggen, “Ashcroft Invokes Religion in U.S. War on Terror”, Washington Post (February 20th
2002), A2.
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While the latter conception envisioned a highly decentralized world of sovereign states and
was in favour of a permissive, voluntary system of law stressing matters of allocation of
competence among sovereign states, the Charter paradigm modified some critical aspects---like
the status of war, the role of national sovereignty and the degree to which authority structures are
decentralized, see R. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International
Legal Order in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 116 (Studies on a Just
World Order, No. 2) (R. Falk, Freidrich Kratochwil, Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.) (London: 1985)
[Hereinafter Falk]
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and hard fought shift towards the Charter paradigm needs to be reiterated under present
day circumstances.
Writing about exceptionalism, like other subjects, entails some innate and
unavoidable worries---like how does one distinguish between “exceptional” and
“necessary”; legally correct and morally justified and so on. But possibly the most
ringing question, in my mind was---“so what?”; indeed, how does a state react, how is the
vicious cycle of action and retaliation on both sides (be it the US and Islamic extremism
or others) get slowed down, if not stopped. Barring any crystal ball analysis, I would
argue that to remain safe, foreign policy and international diplomacy must begin with an
honest chance to the letter of the law---the Charter paradigm governing international
relations;124because while the Westphalian notion rests upon the crucial role of consent in
the forming of international obligations,125 the Charter system (even while giving respect
to this traditional mode of law creation),126allows for the evolution of certain superior
norms (such as customary law prohibiting the use of force) which are enforceable upon
states despite their express codification in a treaty or agreement.
The first principle which needs implementation in this scheme is the prohibition
on war under Article 2(4) of the Charter. This restriction on the capacity of a state to
resort to aggression was expressly adopted contrary to the Westphalian spirit which did
not prohibit recourse to war.127 While there may not be an easy-to-use guide on how to
prevent the pervasion of exceptional tendencies in international relations, unilateral
recourse to aggression and war must be avoided to provide an atmosphere suitable for
dialogue between nations or civilizations as the case may be.
“Sovereign equality”, (discussed earlier with respect to Lee’s assertions) needs to
be reinforced by strengthening the resolve against foreign intervention. The primary
purpose of a foreign policy under the multilateral scheme must be the self-improvement
of the state and the lives of its citizens through a mutually negotiated system of gains.
This immediately requires that nation states not only be self-serving (i.e. focused on
negotiating a mutually higher level of security and standard of living for their citizens)
but also opposed to unsolicited benevolence abroad. This policy is hardly new to the UN
124

This conception of the international legal order however, relies significantly on the ability of
the international community to engage in collective action based upon a fair-minded
interpretation of some common norms, the most central of which are enshrined in A/2(1) and
A/2(7) of the Charter. See Id., where Falk asserts that the principles of “sovereign equality” and
“non-intervention” are even common to the Westphalian notion of international law, Id. at 127.

125

See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER
PAPERS, 1-67 (1958); PERCY CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATION OF STATES, 17-89
(1951).
126

See Falk, supra note 123 at 127. See also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE
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127

In line with its emphasis on the subjective determination by states and its deference to state
consent, the Westphalian conception vested the decision to wage war in the hands of the
sovereign---the highest authority in international society, see Id. at 121.

- 31 -

system which is meant to be used as a conduit to successful dialogue on common
interests and to maintain a “hands off” policy with regard to the domestic interests of
other States.128
Exceptionalism displayed upon provocation is one issue but the rule of law faces
a greater threat from the exceptionalism that is advanced on its own merit. Thus
interventions into foreign States whether on humanitarian or democratic grounds must be
by the UN129 and not based on the “concern” of individual non-involved States,130because
while the former is a useful tool in international conflict resolution, the latter is
guaranteed to incur the wrath of national and regional relativist groups like those who see
themselves defending Islamic values.
A parallel danger in pursuing unilateral, extraterritorial interventions is that at
some stage every state engaged in a “war against terrorism” abroad, will be pressured to
recast its efforts as part of a territorial defense mechanism131---as is the case with the U.S.
and its Department of Homeland Security which threatens the freedoms of a liberal
democratic society. The danger of playing such multifarious parts, was aptly enunciated
by Hawthorne when he wrote,132
“No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself and
another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may
be true.”
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Now is not the time to go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy”,133 because in
playing hunters and slayers, states are losing their identities as self-serving units striving
for self-improvement. Moreover, such an intrusion especially at this present critical
juncture would cause a definite breach of the social compact. It is time for the
international system as a whole to take a step back and concern itself with addressing
admitted common problems through an increasing number of “temporary
alliances”134which collectively address the specific issues in question. This is not to say
that States need to be isolationist; rather they must base foreign policy on pragmaticism
and not on the pursuit of contentious ideologies (to which allegiance must be sought at
home and abroad).
But what then of exceptionalism?
What then of Noll’s insistence that,
“Invoking law – whether in terms of Human Rights or the UN Charter -against this [sovereign] nomos [which believes in the necessity of a state of
exception] would be ridiculous, and will at worst fortify the indistinction
between violence and justice. Where the social contract is derogated
permanently, violence is no longer a mere ‘possibility’ and it becomes
meaningless to speak of a ‘forcible excess’.”135

The answer may well lie in the fact that Noll’s premise of a present and enduring
breach in the social contract (“where the contract is derogated permanently”)136 isn’t
entirely established; it is still too early to state with any degree of confidence that the
U.N. collective security mechanism has been subverted. Evidence of this is found in the
fact that although enough and more concerns have been aired, exceptionalism by itself is
not being accepted or internalized by the international community;137 quite to the
contrary, exceptionalist actions on the part of states are openly rebuked and isolated.
133
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The answer may well lie in pursuing a policy of limited interaction with foreign
states whereby States would recognize, appreciate and negotiate the terms and extent of
cultural relativism, a reconsideration of immediate and forced imposition of democracy in
every society and the State’s need to feel secure about its sovereignty. Safety is also to be
found in not forcing the hand of foreign religious and cultural institutions but rather by
providing incentives and in trusting host nations to use them for the promotion of pubic
welfare as may be deemed fit in every individual State. Thus, in the future,
multilateralism must lay significant stress on and provide adequate rope to individual
States to pursue independent foreign policy aimed at the self-centered pursuit of
improvement of their own societies without encroaching upon the sovereignty and
freedoms of other States and non-state actors respectively. While national security
measures to safeguard against threats from foreign militia is important, the value and
consequences of preemption must be carefully weighed alongside the intelligence
gathered as well as the counsel provided by the United Nations.
What needs to be clearly understood is that the pursuit of an exceptional approach
to international law and diplomacy will open doors to retaliation while closing doors to
co-operative mechanisms. As such it serves neither the multilateral order nor any private
aspirations of empire.
It is often argued that the problems caused by exceptional tendencies are not
going to be resolved by the application of the international legal principles because they
arise out of causes which range from emotion, socio-economic pride to religious fervor,
none of which fall within the realm of conduct, rights and obligations that the law would
seek to control.138 While it is true that not all forms of exceptionalism can be controlled
by the direct application of normative international legal principles, walking the legal line
with honesty will weed out double standards (which incite extremism), manipulation
(which breeds distrust) and suspicion thereby removing opportunities for a rise of
exceptional tendencies against the safety of the cooperative multilateral process.
On a personal note, I believe that in allowing exceptionalist activities to create an
order which endorses the sidestepping of international legal standards (for reasons
ranging from fear to retribution), we effectively turn a blind eye to our misgivings; and
the rule of law was never meant for the coward.
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